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NOTES AND COMMENT

In Fischer v. Stevens 7 cited in Phillips v. Holland, supra, we again
find the situation of an entirely executed contract and a consequent
holding that the involved contract is outside the operation of the statute
of frauds. Here an equitable defense was interposed which involved
an oral extension of time. The plaintiff in this case agreed to extend
the indebtedness if the debtor would give him a note for an acquired
claim and a judgment which the plaintiff had against the debtor. The
court says at page 771:
But the rule in this state and the decided weight of authority seem to be that
an agreement made after the note becomes due, for'its extension after a definite
time, when supported by a valuable consideration, as in this case, and is otherwise
valid [italics, mine] though verbal may be interposed as a bar to an action on
the note or mortgage, brought within that time.

It then seems that none of the cited cases are precisely in point.
In the present case, the last payment of interest had not been paid.
It therefore was not an executed contract,. and the Court,
Not being bound by any former rulings of this court to the contrary, we,
therefore, feel free to follow that which seems to be the better reason and logic,
namely, that the statute of frauds in question, making void contracts not to be
performed within a year and not in writing, apply to just such contracts as are
here involved; namely, those extending the time of the payment of a promissory
note.

The Court in coming to this conclusion, apparently clarifies the
law as regards contracts for the payment of money which by their
.terms is not to be performed within a year. It would seem that such
contracts are within the operation of the statute unless rescued therefrom by performance; and such performance must be a complete
execution of the consideration on one side. Thus, prepayment of interest, payment of interest when not yet due, or any other act totally
executed which provides consideration for an oral extension of time
for more than one year removes the entire contract from the operation of the statute of frauds.
CHARLES L. GOLDBERG

-

Wills: Undue influence; bequest in favor of one occupying'a
confidential relationship with testator.
The recent case of In re Weaver's Estate,' is the latest addition to
the long" line of Wisconsin cases which protect the aged and infirm
desirous of making wills from the unlawful solicitations of their relatives. The right to dispose of property by will is one of the oldest
rights known to law and is one of the rights which the law most zealously guards. In this most recent case the testator made a will in
which he gave 12o acres of land to one son, Robert, forty acres to
the contestant, his son, Louis, and forty acres to his daughter. The
personal property was divided equally among the three children. By
a codicil executed about two months before his death he gave the
same 12o acres to Robert and the other eighty to his daughter. The
1143 Mo. 18I; 44 S.W. 769.
'-
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personal property was this time divided equally between these two
children and Louis was cut off with a bequest of $ioo. In the personal property thus taken away from Louis were some royalties from
a mine which had yielded large profits during the last few years.
Testator had lived for a number of years with Louis and his relations
with this son were entirely pleasant. Robert was the confidential
adviser of his father in all business matters. On the day that the
codicil was made Robert had invited the old man to go to town with
him, and although he disclaims any knowledge of what went on while
they were there, he was -in the lawyer's outer office when the codicil
was being executed. The court saw in these circumstances a clear
case of undue influence and reversed the judgment of the lower court
admitting the will to probate.
The court in this case follows the rule laid down in the case of
Dazis v. Dean,2 that where an aged and infirm person makes disposition of his property under circumstances which arouse suspicion and
in such a way as to inflict an injustice on the heirs of such aged person, the law casts upon the one who profits by such disposition of property the burden of showing that such disposition was untainted with
undue influence or other fraud, and that the 'will was the intelligent
and deliberate act of the testator.
In 40 Cyc. ii44 we find this statement:
The rule as to what constitutes undue influence has been variously stated,
the substance of the statements is, that, to be sufficient to avoid a will,
influence exerted must be of such a kind that so overpowers and subjugates
mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency, and make him express
will of another, rather than his own.

but
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The evidence adduced to show undue influence must usually establish that there is an unjust or unnatural result in the will; that the
testator was a fit subject for the exercise of the influence; that there
was a person who had a motive for the exercise; and that there was
an opportunity for its exercise.3 There must be a showing that the
influence was exerted actually on the mind of the testator in regard
4
to this particular will at or near the time of its execution.
Practically the question in each -case is whether the influence shown
by the testimony was "undue" within the meaning of the rules above.
No specific amount of influence can be said to be undue. The quantity
must vary with the circumstances in each case-with the strength of
mind possessed by the testator, and with the relationship of the parties.
In the case of In re Weaver's Estate, supra, the undue influence was
exerted by one in a confidential relationship with the testator. Now
it is not the law that all influences are unlawful. There are many
appeals which may legitimately be addressed to the judgment of the
testator. This general rule applies as well where the influence is exerted by one in a confidential relation to the deceased as where it is
exerted by a stranger. The influence wielded by the wife, child, parent,
guardian, attorney, physician, spiritual adviser, or other confidential
266 Wis. ioo.
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' 40 Cyc. 1145.

See generally Rood on Wills, 175-19I.
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relator of the testator is not per se undue. Like the influence of all
other persons it must overwhelm the will of the testator without convincing his judgment. -As a rule undue influence will not be presumed
from the mere existence of the fiduciary relationship, although such
relationship may cause the courts to view the transaction with more
scrutiny than otherwise.
In this connection the case of Armstrong v. Arntstrong5 is interesting. The testimony there showed that the husband of the testatrix
asked an attorney to come to the house as his wife wanted to make a
will. The attorney, from statements of the husband as to what his
wife wished the will to be, prepared it in advance. It gave all her
property to her husband. Later the will was brought to the house
and read to the testatrix on her deathbed. She signified that it was
"just what she wanted" and thereupon it was duly executed. The facts
were held not to show any undue influence on the part of the husband.
In Deck v. Deck6 the husband made his will about three days before the death of his wife. He consulted her about it and she in fact
dictated its provisions to him. The will practically disinherited three
of the children. It was objected that the will was invalid for undue
influence because the wife had a controlling interest in its making.
In passing on this objection the court said:
But with whom should he consult and by whom should he be influenced under
such circumstances, if not by his wife, the mother of all his children? Presumptively she was controlled by motives of natural affection and propriety, as
well as himself." This court held many years ago that "motives of natural affection and gratitude on the part of the testator, and solicitations and arguments
which appeal to such motives, do not constitute undue influence."'

In the case of Ball v. Boston5 the i-ule is very well laid down by
Justice Marshall.
Undue influence is the very antithesis of right influence. It exists only where
there is a practical destruction of voluntary volition-at least, is moral coerion
for an ulterior purpose.
(Citing Anderson v. Laugen)' This species of
wrongful influence should never be compared with influence through affection
or disposition to favor a'member of one's family produced by feelings of esteem
or gratitude .....
In Ball v. Boston, supra, the testator was aged, infirm, and addicted
to alcoholism. His first wife, with whom ,he had lived happily for thirty
years, was dead, and his children were now independent of him financially, favorably disposed toward him, but so circumstanced as not to be
able to take care of him in his old age. In this situation he married
his former housekeeper, a mature lady, apparently of quite strong
character. They secluded themselves from the rest of the world, and
she took care of him until his death, about a year later. There was
testimony that she took an active interest in his business; sued one
'63 Wis. 162.
a ic6 Wis. 470.
'Ii re Jackmanms Will, 26 Wis. iO4.
S 153 Wis. 27.
122 Wis. 57.
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of his sons for an old laundry bill; when he made his will kept it
secret from the children; and tried to have him make over to her an
insurance policy payable to his estate. The court concluded from
these facts that the opportunity to exercise undue influence is not
satisfied by the ordinary seclusion and association in the domestic relations of husband and wife. Neither the natural attention of the
wife to her invalid husband, nor her efforts in carrying on his business, nor her efforts, at his request, in expressing efficiently his dying
wishes as regards his property, are badges of fraud.
It will be noted in the case of In re Weaver's Estate, supra, that
the court saw in the testimony all the essentials of undue influence.
Justice Stevens points out that here was a susceptible person, an opportunity to exert an unlawful influence, a motive for its exercise,
and an unnatural and unjust result in the will.
We may conclude generally, therefore, that the influence of a wife,
or a child,"0 over the testator is not presumed to be unlawful because
of the mere existence of the relationship. Nor are wills made to persons who have obtained a place 'in the affections of the testator by
reason of their kindness to him subject to be attacked on the ground
of undue influence."
Even where the confidential relationship involved is an adulterous one' 2 and the will is made in favor of a
mistress, it will not be avoided on the ground of undue influence if
it expresses the true wish of the testator. In all these cases no presumption of undue influence
will arise until the contestant has made
3
out a prima facie case.1
THOMAS A. BYRNE
"Itn re Butler, iio Wis. 70; Thompson v. Ish, 99 Mo. 16o, 17 Am.S.R. 552.
"28 R.C.L. I4O; Riley v. Sherwood, 144 Mo. 354, 3 Prob. Rep. An. 5i9.
=40 Cyc. 1,149; 31 Am.S.R. 68o.
'In re Weaver's Estate, supra; Davis v. Dean, 66 Wis. ioo; Ball v. Boston,
supra.

